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Abstract—We consider secrecy obtained when one transmits
on a Gaussian Wiretap channel above the secrecy capacity.
Instead of equivocation, we consider probability of error as the
criterion of secrecy. The usual channel codes are considered for
transmission. The rates obtained can reach the channel capacity.
We show that the ”confusion” caused to the Eve when the rate
of transmission is above capacity of the Eve’s channel is similar
to the confusion caused by using the wiretap channel codes used
below the secrecy capacity.
Index Terms—Probability of error, Secrecy, Equivocation,
Strong converse.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic security is being widely studied in
recent times ([18], [4]). It provides fundamental limits of
secret communication. Unlike in cryptography, the information
theoretic techniques, are not based on complexity of computa-
tional hardness of certain problems. Furthermore, information
theoretic security can also be used in a system along with
cryptographic techniques to add additional layers of protection
to the information transmission or to achieve key agreement
and/or distribution.
Information theoretic formulations for ‘reliable communica-
tion’ and ‘secrecy’ were provided in classic papers of Shannon
[23] and [24]. A secret communication system model considers
reliable transmission of information from the transmitter to the
intended receiver but this information should not be decoded
by the eavesdropper. Shannon characterized reliable commu-
nication using average probability of error and ‘secrecy’ using
equivocation. The properties of equivocation are also discussed
in [24]. Shannon considered the case of perfect secrecy when
equivocation H(W |Zn) = H(W ), where W is the message
transmitted, and Zn is the received symbol at the eavesdropper.
This of course implies I(W ;Zn) = 0. A weaker form of
secrecy is I(W,Zn)→ 0 as n→∞ [4]. It is further weakened
to I(W ;Zn)/n → 0 in [19]. This implies that the average
probability of error to the eavesdropper goes to 1.
In this set-up of ‘secret communication’ a natural definition
of secrecy would be that the intended receiver decodes the
message with average probability of error going to zero and
the eavesdropper decodes the message with average probability
of error going to one. Recently a similar notion of secrecy is
also considered in [2] and [16]. In [2] this notion is used
to obtain lattice codes which satisfy such secrecy criteria. In
[16] it is pointed out that obtaining practical codes satisfying
equivocation criterion is very challenging. Therefore they
obtain LDPC codes which can provide high probability of
error to Eve at comparatively low transmir power. We consider
this definition in this paper and study the achievable rates on
wiretap channel and show that this natural definition leads
to improved transmission rates. Then we relate the secrecy
obtained via usual codes in this setup to the secrecy obtained
via the wiretap codes. We also relate the probability of error at
the eavesdropper to equivocation. In the following we survey
the related literature.
‘Wiretap channel’ introduced and studied by Wyner [28],
captures the physical communication secrecy problem. ‘Wire-
tap channel’ is modelled as a degraded broadcast channel
and assumes that the channel between the transmitter and
the receiver is better than the channel from the transmitter to
the eavesdropper. Wyner’s work was extended by Leung and
Hellman [17] to the Gaussian channel. Csisza`r and Ko¨rner [6]
considers a general discrete memoryless broadcast channel,
and shows that the secrecy capacity is positive if the main
channel to the intended user is more capable than of the
eavesdropper, and zero if the wiretapper’s channel is less
noisy. Practical coding schemes using LDPC codes for wiretap
channel are available in [26]. The secrecy over a fading
channel was studied in [13]. In [3], a wire-tap channel with
slow fading is studied where an outage analysis with full CSI
of the eavesdropper and imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper
was performed. It is shown that in wireless channels fading
helps to provide secrecy rates even if the average SNR of the
main channel is poor compared to the eavesdropper’s channel.
Our notion of secrecy will be related to equivocation based
secrecy via converse results in Information theory. The usual
converse result considers average probability of error and is
called ‘weak converse’. It shows that for a discrete memoryless
channel when R > C the probability of decoding error is
bounded away from zero [10]. The strong converse shows
that the maximum probability of decoding error of a MAP
(Maximum Aposteriori Probability) decoder tends to one as
block length goes to infinity [27]. We will use strong converse
to formulate the coding schemes. We will also show that
the confusion caused by the usual coding schemes to the
eavesdropper is not much different from that caused by wiretap
codes.
Fano’s inequality provides a tight lower bound on the
error probability in terms of the conditional entropy. A tight
Fig. 1. The Wiretap channel
upper bound on the error probability in terms of conditional
entropy is provided in [9] which also finds relations between
probability of error in a MAP decoder and the conditional
entropy. Relation between error probability and conditional
entropy are also provided in [15]. We will use these to get
bounds on the equivocation at the Eve for our scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we define the model and notation. In Section III, we provide
our coding-decoding schemes using average probability of
error as the measure of both reliability and secrecy. We
show that using these codes one attains secrecy close to that
of the wiretap codes. Section IV finds the relation between
the chosen criterion of probability of error and equivocation.
Section V extends the results to a Gaussian fading channel.
We conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. MODEL AND NOTATION
We consider a Gaussian Wiretap system (Fig. 1) where
a transmitter Alice wants to communicate the message to a
legitimate receiver Bob. There is also an eavesdropper, Eve,
who is trying to get access to the message sent to Bob. The
transmitter chooses message W for transmission from a set
W = {1, 2, ...,M},M = 2nR, with uniform distribution.
These messages are encoded into codewords (X1, ..., Xn) with
a power constraint E[X2] ≤ P . At time i, Alice transmits Xi,
Bob receives Yi = Xi + N1i and the eavesdropper receives
Zi = Xi+N2i. The noise sequences {N1i} and {N2i} are as-
sumed to be independent of {Xi} and also of each other. Also,
we assume that N1i ∼ N (0, σ21) and N2i ∼ N (0, σ22) and
σ21 < σ
2
2 , where N (a, b) denotes Gaussian density with mean
a and variance b. The decoder at Bob estimates the transmitted
message as W˜ from Y n ≡ {Y1, ..., Yn}. It is assumed that Bob
as well as Eve know the chosen codebooks. We use Pne (B)
and Pne (E) to denote the average probability of decoding error
for block length n at Bob and Eve respectively for the MAP
decoder. Our secrecy requirement is that Pne (B) → 0 and
Pne (E)→ 1.
III. CAPACITY RESULTS
In this section we characterize the achievable rates for the
model in Figure 1. Let C1 = 0.5 log(1 + P/σ21) and C2 =
0.5 log(1 + P/σ22). Since σ21 < σ22 , C1 > C2. The proof of
the following proposition, although simple is given for sake
of completeness.
Proposition: All rates R such that 0 < R < C1 are
achievable for a Gaussian wiretap channel such that the
probability of decoding error, Pne (B), at Bob goes to zero
and the probability of decoding error, Pne (E), at eve goes to
one as, n→∞.
Proof: Consider the region C2 < R < C1. In this region, as
in the case of a usual Gaussian channel, we generate n length
iid Gaussian codewords with X ∼ N (0, P ). It can be proved
using the channel coding theorem for the Gaussian channel [5]
that any rate R < C can be achieved for the Gaussian channel
from Alice to Bob. The condition R < C1 ensures reliable
communication from Alice to Bob ensuring that Pne (B)→ 0
exponentially as n → ∞. Also since R > C2, by the strong
converse to the coding theorem (in [1] it is proved for discrete
alphabet channels but the result extends to the continuous
alphabet channels, see, e.g., [22]) the average probability of
decoding error for any decoder goes to one exponentially as
n → ∞. As this happens for any codebook, it is valid for
the chosen codebook that gives reliable communication from
Alice to Bob.
Now consider the region 0 < R < C2. In this region we
use coding-decoding schemes as above but with reduced power
P < P such that 0.5 log(1+P/σ22) < R < 0.5 log(1+P/σ21).
This ensures that we achieve reliable transmission to Bob and
secrecy at Eve. 
Hence any rate 0 < R < C is achievable with Bob getting
the message reliably and eve’s probability of error as large as
we wish. The block length n should be chosen large enough
to satisfy any target probability of error to Bob and Eve. For
example suppose we need Pne (B) < β1 and Pne (E) > β2.
Then for Pne (E) > β2, rate R and block length n should be
such that ([21])
R > C2 −
√
V
n
Q−1(β2) +
logn
2
(1)
where Q is the function,
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
e−
y2
2 dy,
V is the channel dispersion,
V =
S2
2
S2 + 2
(S2 + 1)2
log2 e (2)
and S2 = P/σ22 , the SNR for Eve. Also, for Pne (B) < β1,
n and R should satisfy the inequality in (Theorem 41, [21]).
These bounds are very accurate even for small n. From (1) we
see that R does not even need to exceed C2. This improves the
rate over the secrecy capacity definition based on equivocation
([18]):
C = 0.5 log(1 + P/σ21)− 0.5 log(1 + P/σ22). (3)
The equivocation based secrecy systems employ a stochastic
encoder whereas in our scheme all rates 0 < R < C1 can be
achieved by the usual encoders employing random codebooks
(in practice one can use LDPC and Turbo codes to obtain rates
close to C1). For equivocation based schemes also one can get
the required probability of error to Bob and Eve by ensuring
large enough block length n. However the rate obtained can
be quite low and it requires more complex encoders.
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Fig. 2. Probability of Error vs SNR
Numerical Example
For σ21 = 0.1, σ22 = 1.5, and P = 20dB, Pne (B)
and Pne (E) are plotted in Fig 2 for n = 50, 100 and 200.
For Pne (B) Gallagers random coding bound and for Pne (E)
Arimoto’s lower bound are plotted (see section IV for these
bounds).
In the following we discuss the capacity achieving encoding
and decoding of Theorem 1 and show how it provides security
close to the equivocation based schemes. Our arguments are
general and can be used for non-Gaussian DMC Wiretap
channels also.
To achieve rate R, C1 > R > C2, we select an input
distribution PX such that I(X ;Y ) > R > I(X ;Z) where
X ∼ PX and Y and Z are the corresponding channel outputs
to Bob and Eve respectively. We generate a codebook with
X1, ..., Xn iid ∼ PX , 2nR independent codewords, where n
is chosen such that Bob’s block-probability of error is less than
a target value. Bob and Eve can use decoders based on (weak)
joint typicality which are asymptotically optimal. Then if Eve
receives Zn on transmission of codeword Xn corresponding
to (say) message 1, probability that Zn is jointly typical with
a codeword corresponding to another codeword is 2−nI(X;Z).
Let N be the number of codewords other than that of message
1 that are jointly typical with Zn. Let Ak be the event that
the kth codeword is jointly typical with Zn. Then
N =
2nR∑
k=2
1{Ak=1} (4)
and E[N ] = (2nR − 1)2−nI(X;Z).
Since random variable 1{Ak=1} has an exponential moment,
we can also show that P [|N − E[N ]| > ǫ] decays (super)
exponentially with n, to zero:
P [| N − E[N ] |> δ] ≤ e−sδ2−2nR(n(R−I(X;Z))− sln2 (5)
for any δ > 0 and any s > 0 for all n such that n(R −
I(X ;Z)) > sln2 . Then, for all n, N + 1(including message
1 also) will be very close to 2n(R−I(X;Z)). By symmetry,
if Eve has no other information, she should select any one
of these codewords. Therefore, probability that Eve selects
message 1 ≈ 2−n(R−I(X;Z)). Since R can be taken close to
C1 and I(X ;Z) ≤ C2, probability of error for the Eve can be
2−n(C1−C2) which is the maximum rate at which Eve’s prob-
ability of error decays in the equivocation based secrecy also
(when there is strong secrecy: I(Xn;Zn) → 0). Interpreting
secrecy this way is one way of explaining why strong secrecy
is stronger than weak secrecy: 1
n
I(Xn;Zn)→ 0.
For the AWGN Wiretap channel, using sphere packing
arguments, one can again connect how the standard coding
techniques relate to the secrecy based coding techniques.
If the messages are uniformly distributed, ML decoder is
optimal. Suppose Eve uses ML decoder. If x1(1), ..., xn(1)
is transmitted, for ML decoding Eve’s decoder decodes as
message mˆ on receiving Zn if
mˆ = argmin
n∑
k=1
(Zk − xk(mˆ))2 . (6)
This can be reinterpreted as
∑n
k=1(Zk − xk(mˆ))2 < r2 for r
an appropriate constant. Since
Zk − xk(1) = N2k (7)
where N2k, k ≥ 1 is iid ∼ N (0, σ22) the receiver noise at Eve,
N22k are χ
2
-central distributed random variables with finite
exponential moments in a neighbourhood of 0. Thus, by ([14])
∞∑
n=1
βnP
[
sup
k≥n
| 1
k
k∑
i=1
N22i − σ22 |> δ
]
<∞ (8)
for any δ > 0 and for some β > 1. In particular
P
[|∑ni=1N2i − nσ22 | > nδ] → 0 exponentially. Therefore,
for a reasonable probability of error, Eve must have r >
√
nσ2
for even moderate values of n. Since again, from the above
argument
∑n
k=1 Z
2
k is close to n(P + σ22) for any transmitted
codeword, maximum number of spheres with radius
√
nσ2,
within this sphere is(√
n(P + σ22)
)n
√
nσ22
=
(
1 +
P
σ22
)n
2
. (9)
Since we have 2nR codewords, in one sphere of radius
√
nσ2
we will have
2nR(
1 + P
σ2
2
)n
2
= 2n(R−C2) (10)
codewords. Thus Eve will confuse with 2n(R−C2) codewords
if r ≥ √nσ2. This is the same number we obtained above if
the decoder uses joint typicality.
In equivocation based security Eve is confused by mapping
at the stochastic encoder a message into multiple codewords.
In the above coding scheme, a stochastic encoder may not
be used, but still the decoder at Eve is confused among
multiple codewords. The only difference is that unlike in
equivocation case the codewords now with which Eve confuses
represent real messages (i.e, carry useful information) for Bob
thus increasing the transmission rate for Bob. Furthermore,
importantly, since in equivocation based approach the total
number of messages to be sent is 2nR < 2n(C1−C2), Eve
confuses among 2nR messages only, which is no more than
the number we obtained in our approach. Thus in a way, the
secrecy(confusion) our approach is providing is no less than in
the equivocation case although we can transmit at rates upto
C1.
It will perhaps be useful in our setup that if two messages
W1 and W2 are ’close’ to each other in some meaningful way
then they should be coded into Xn sequences which are not
close to each other in Euclidean space (for AWGN channel,
similar care can be taken for other channels). Actually it seems
to be the typical case for codes with rates close to capacity.
Wyner [28] also discusses the rate region (R,Re) where
Re = lim supn→∞
H(W |Zn)
n
. These Rates in fact turn out to
be R ≤ C1 and Re ≤ C1−C2. Our codebook using the usual
point to point capacity achieving code also meets these criteria.
But considering secrecy from probability of error point of view
advocates using rate point (C1, C1−C2) (in fact sending at rate
upto C1 in which all messages are secure from Eve) unlike the
equivocation view where (C1 −C2, C1 −C2) is the preferred
point ([18], [7]).
IV. RELATION BETWEEN PROBABILITY OF ERROR AND
EQUIVOCATION
In order to further relate our coding scheme to equivocation
based secrecy, in this section we compute equivocation at Bob
and Eve for our coding.
When C2 < R < C1, Pne (B) → 0, exponentially and
Pne (E)→ 1 exponentially. By Fano’s inequality [5]
H(W |Y n) ≤ H(Pne (B)) + Pne (B)nR (11)
where H(p) = −p log(p) − (1 − p) log(1 − p). If Pne (B) ≤
e−αn then, expanding H(p) at p = 0 via Taylor series we get
H(p) = p′ log((1 − p′)/p′) for some p′ ∈ (0, p) and hence
H(Pne (B) ≤ αne−αn. Thus H(W |Y n) decays exponentially
too. Similarly, the upper bound (11) for H(W | Zn) goes to
nR exponentially.
From [9] we get more refined results. For Bob, for any
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1,
H(W | Y n) ≤
(
1 +
1
ρ
)
e−n[E0(ρ,p)−ρR] (12)
where p is the distribution of X , E0(ρ, p) is the Gallager’s
random coding exponent ([11]),
E0(ρ, p) = −log
(∫
y
(∫
x
p(x)p(y | x) 11+ρ dx
)1+ρ
dy
)
(13)
and p(y | x) is the channel transition function. Thus, H(W |
Y n)→ 0 exponentially.
For Eve, since I(W ;Zn) ≤ nC2, 1nH(W | Zn) ≥ R−C2
for all codebooks.
A more accurate lower bound on H(W | Zn) can be
obtained from [9], Theorem 1,
H(W | Zn) ≥ φ∗(π(W | Zn)), (14)
where φ∗ is a piecewise linear, continuous, non-decreasing,
convex function provided in [9] and π(W | Zn) is the average
probability of error for the MAP decoder at Eve. π(W | Zn)
in (14) can be replaced by the Arimoto’s lower bound ([1])
π(W | Zn) ≥ 1− e−n(E0(ρ,p)−ρR), 0 ≥ ρ ≥ −1. (15)
Minimizing the exponent with respect to p and maximizing
w.r.t ρ provides a universal lower bound.
V. FADING CHANNEL
A fading wiretap channel model can be mathematically
represented as:
Yi = hiXi +N1i, (16)
Zi = giXi +N2i, (17)
where hi, gi are the normalized complex channel gains from
Alice to Bob and Eve respectively at instant i. We assume
that these gains are available at Alice, Bob and Eve. We take
σ21 = σ
2
2 = 1. Also denote the instantaneous power gains by
q(i) = |h(i)|2 and r(i) = |g(i)|2. The rest of the model is
same as in Section II. For this case the capacity achieving
signalling scheme based on equivocation at Eve is to transmit
at instances when q > r and adapt the instantaneous power
according to q and r. The capacity is [13]:
Cs =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r
[log(1 + qP ∗(q, r)) −
log(1 + rP ∗(q, r))]f(q)f(r)dqdr (18)
where E[P ∗(q, r)] = P ,
P ∗(q, r) = 0.5[
√
(1/r − 1/q)2 + 4/λ(1/r − 1/q) +
(1/r + 1/q)]+ (19)
and λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint with equality.
Now we extend our proposition to include fading. We use a
scheme similar to that in [13] but with the condition Pne (B)→
0 and Pne (E) → 1 as n → ∞. We can make the following
claim: All rates R such that 0 < R < C1 are achievable
for a Gaussian wiretap channel such that the probability of
decoding error, Pne (B), at Bob goes to zero and the probability
of decoding error, Pne (E), at eve goes to one as, n→∞ where
C1 = sup
P (q,r)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
r
[log(1 + qP (q, r))]f(q)f(r)dqdr. (20)
.The optimal power allocation is ’water-filling’ w.r.t. the dis-
tribution of q conditioned on q > r (i.e., we transmit only
when q > r and optimize power for this case).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses a new notion of secrecy for improving the
rates in a Gaussian wire-tap channel. This new notion is based
on using probability of error as the measure of secrecy at both
the intended receiver and also the eavesdropper. In such a set
up, it is shown that the random codes used for point to point
communication can be used to provide secrecy as well. We
relate this notion of secrecy to the equivocation based secrecy.
The results are also extended to a fading channel.
We believe that this notion of secrecy is strong enough
for practical purposes (and in a way can provide secrecy
equivalent to the equivocation based approach) , but uses usual
channel codes and provides the maximum possible rates for
reliable transmission to the intended receiver. Although we
have shown these concepts on a Wiretap channel, these ideas
can obviously be used on other channels as well.
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